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THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE
I. INTRODUCTION
D URING THE LAST DECADE a number of attempts have been made by the
courts in the realm of patent and copyright law to settle the issue of
the protection of property rights in computer software.' These traditional
methods of protection, however, have not been able to assimilate this relative-
ly new technological invention.' Likewise, at the start of a new decade, little
or no progress towards a comprehensive form of software protection can be
detected. This paper will examine the problems associated with using
federal patent or copyright law to provide computer software protection
and discuss why state trade secret protection has remained the primary
guarantee against infringement of property rights in computer software.
A. Definition of Terms
Before discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each of the
primary forms of protection of computer software, it is necessary to define
the computer-related terms that will be utilized in the remainder of this
article.
Computer "software" may simply be defined as everything except
computer "hardware." Hardware is the physical electrical circuits, motors,
tape drives, relays, printers and readers, and memory which make up the
mechanical and electrical parts of the computer. In contrast to computer
hardware which has little useful application without programming, com-
puter software instructs the various hardware components of the computer.
Software may be characterized as falling within one of two major categories:
1) operation or system software or 2) application software."
System software is composed of the software which is usually resident
within the computer memory and remains part of it during all operations.
It performs the scheduling and translating of the application software and
' For example, the question of the patentability of computer software has come before the
United States Supreme Court on three separate occasions without a complete resolution
of the issue. See Parker v. Flook, 247 U.S. 584 (1978); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219
(1976); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). A discussion of these cases appears in
the text accompanying notes 50-84.2 See, e.g., In re De Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (patent denied since directed
towards mathematical result); Data Cash Systems, Inc., v. J.S.&A. Group, Inc. 480 F. Supp.
1063 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (copyright does not protect "object" version of computer program);
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (state trade secret protection may not conflict
with federal laws providing more limited protection).
3Ross, The Patentability of Computer "Firmware", 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 731, 736 n.15
(1977).
4 See, e.g., M. Pope & P. Pope, Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer Software,
30 ALA. L. REv. 527, 531 (1979).
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maintains general control of the computer functions.' System software,
generally written in "machine language," is a low-level computer language
that is unintelligible except to the computer.6 This type of language most
closely resembles the mathematical equivalent of a series of "on/off"
switches. Machine language and system software is unique to an individual
computer model and would not function on another computer of a different
design.' However, system software does provide the means to translate
high-level applications software into a set of instructions which can operate
the computer hardware.'
Application software is what is commonly referred to as a computer
program.9 This is what an individual user will write and place in a com-
puter to produce a desired result. Application software is written in a high-
level computer language. For example, a few of the most widely used
languages include FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslation), COBOL (COm-
mon Business Oriented Language), BASIC, and PL/1. These languages
are human-oriented and use common words or mathematical symbols, such
as "Add A to B" or "C = A + B", to perform different operations. Each
computer system software translates these universal, high-level languages
into the machine language the individual computer can understand. Appli-
cation software, hereafter referred to as a computer program, may be com-
posed of one or more mathematical expressions called "algorithms." An
algorithm is simply a mathematical solution to a problem (e.g., "if A is
greater than B, add B to C").1° It must be written exactly in the form of
the high-level computer language being used, such as BASIC, or the com-
puter will not perform the functional intent of the programmer.
B. The Development of a Computer Program
Traditionally, there have been two steps in the development of a com-
puter program. First, a programmer would devise a "flow chart" before writ-
ing the computer program in a chosen high-level language.1' A flow chart
is merely a graphical outline of what the programmer intends the computer
program to do, such as add the month's invoices, calculate depreciation or
estimate product life. Today, many programmers no longer prepare a flow
5 Id.
6 For an in-depth judicial discussion of the various levels of computer languages, including
"machine language," see Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S.&A. Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
1063, 1065 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
7Ross, supra note 3, at 755 n.140.
Sid.
9 See, e.g., Scafetta, Computer Software Protection: The Copyright Revision Bills and Al-
ternatives, 8 J. MAui. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 381, 383 (1975).
26 For a judicial definition of "algorithm", see Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65, 73
(1972).
21 See note 6 supra.
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chart on paper but have a mental image of what is desired and proceed di-
rectly to the second step in computer programming, writing the "source"
program."2
The source program is composed of a series of algorithms written in
a high-level language which the programmer has chosen to accomplish
his goal. It should be remembered, however, that a computer can only per-
form what it is programmed to do. The source program may simply be written
on paper, punched on cards or paper tape, or stored on magnetic tape or
computer memory.13 As a result, any computer whose system software has
been designed to translate the high-level language of the source program
into machine language that the computer can understand will be able
to use the source program.
The source program is then "read" into the computer. This may
be accomplished in one of two ways. One method is by direct communi-
cation with the computer by means of a typewriter-type keyboard. Or
the source program can be recorded on magnetic or paper tape and
the tape then transferred to the computer. As the computer reads the
source program it transforms it, by means of its system software, into a series
of electrical impulses. Finally, the computer translates the electrical repre-
sentation of the source program into a machine language "object" program
which the computer is able to understand.1" This latter program may also
be printed by the computer on cards, paper tape, or magnetic tape for use
on similar computers. Source and object programs are usually the products"5
which are sold, licensed, disclosed, and, on occasion, misappropriated. It
is for these forms of computer software, the source and object application
programs, that it is most difficult to offer meaningful protection of the de-
veloper's property rights.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF PROPERTY RIGHT PROTECTION IN THE
COMPUTER SOFTWARE FIELD
The need for protection of property rights in computer software
has not always been recognized.1 Early computer programs were either for
government or university-supported research programs and had little im-
12 Generally, source programs are what programmers commonly refer to as computer pro-
grams.
Isid.
14 The court in Data Cash noted: "Object programs, which enter into the mechanical pro-
cess itself, cannot be read without the aid of special equipment and cannot be understood
by even the most experienced programmers." 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
15 See, e.g., Comment, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs Under the 1976 Copy-
right Act, 52 IND. L.J. 503, 506 (1977).
I6 Nimtz, Development of the Law of Computer Software Protection, 61 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 3, 7 (1979).
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mediate commercial application. The programs were individualized for
particular machine requirements and, as a result, were immune from piracy.
Furthermore, as the computer became more commercial many computer
.manufacturers introduced the marketing concept of "bundling."1 Bundling
meant that the user bought the computer and received the software free.
This was important to the infant computer industry since many potential
users did not possess in-house computer expertise. However, an independent
software industry emerged late in the 1950's and early in the 1960's. This
fact, coupled with the availability of in-house programmers, caused manu-
facturers to stop providing free computer software systems.' 8 It was the
emergence of these independent software companies that expanded the need
for effective computer software protection.
Any method of protection should adequately protect the financial
investment made by the software developer and allow him to attain a reason-
able profit. In addition, the public should benefit because the developer will
be encouraged to invest in additional software programs if the risks of
misappropriation are minimized. Consequently, technological progress would
be encouraged by dissemination of significant computer software develop-
ments.1" These goals often appear to be mutually exclusive, however, since
any increase in availability of software in which a developer has a property
right results in a corresponding increase in the risk that the developer's
property rights will be compromised.
Three primary forms of protection have been utilized for the protection
of property rights in computer software: 1) patent, 2) copyright, and 3)
trade secrecy."0 Throughout the subsequent discussion of these areas, it is clear
that one difficulty in providing protection for computer software emanates
from its nature. For example, computer software is obviously a writing,
but this writing can take many physical and electrical forms."' Likewise,
the content of the writing may be the embodiment of a mathematical
formula, a set of instructions to control another machine, or a unique
computational method. Understanding the nature of the content of the
software, as well as the form it is in, is the first step in deciding which
forms of protection will best protect the property interests of the de-
veloper. Furthermore, apparent and sometimes real inconsistencies in court
T Id.
.8 Id.
1 9 See Comment, Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Programs: Are Patents
Now Obtainable? 26 CATI. U.L. REV. 835 (1977); but see, Keeffe & Mahn, Protecting Soft-
ware: Is It Worth All the Trouble? 62 A.B.A.J. 906 (1976).
20 See M. Pope & P. Pope, supra note 4, at 527. Generally, these commentators feel that
these methods have had varying degrees of success or failure.
21 Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013
(N.D. Tex. 1978).
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rulings can best be understood and distinguished by determining how the
court views the application of the computer software and the protection
the court affords that application."2
III. PATENT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
A patent is a federal grant of exclusive monopoly for controlling who may
make, use, or sell an invention." This grant of monopoly is valid against inde-
pendent discovery"' and encourages an inventor to disseminate his in-
vention by guaranteeing him a right to civil action and damages for in-
fringement."2 The patent provides a definite term of protection, seventeen
years, after which the invention becomes the property of the public.' To
be patented the invention must meet strict standards of proper subject
matter, novelty, and nonobviousness. ' Patent law will only protect inventions
which consist of a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."28 As a
result, patents will not be issued for discovery of laws of nature, mathematical
expressions (algorithms), or other fundamental truths.' A mere idea with-
out an end-use is not patentable.2
The first patent applications for computer programs were based upon
machine claims3 and premised on the logic that a new computer program
intended for a general purpose computer gives rise to a patentable inven-
tion." The courts initially upheld these patent claims for computer software."
In 1966, however, a Report by the President's Commission on the Patent
22 See e.g., authorities cited note 2 supra.
23 Section 271 (a) of the United States Code provides, "Except as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the
United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (1976).
24 Id.
25 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 284 (1976).
26 Section 154 of the United States Code provides, "Every patent shall contain a short
title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of
seventeen years, subject to the payment of issue fees as provided for in this title, of the
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
27 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1976).
2
8 Id. § 101.
29 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See also, Note, Patentability of Computer Programs, 56 DT.
J. URa. L. 289, 294 (1978).
30 Congress has relied on the judiciary to define what is proper subject matter for a patent
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (a mere idea is an
unpatentable mental process).
32 See, e.g., M. Pope & P. Pope, supra note 4, at 536.
32 ld. at n.43.
33See In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d
1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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System recommended that patents not be issued for computer software."4
Prior to this report, the Patent Office had given notice of proposed new
guidelines for patent application. Published in 1968, these guidelines main-
tained that computer software was no longer patentable whether based on
machine or process claims."5 This view followed the rationale of Cochrane
v. Deener8 which stated that a process was only patentable if a "physical
transformation" occurred in a given article." As such, computer programs
were only patentable if the computer was transformed into a special pur-
pose machine by the computer program. 8 This approach followed the
"mental steps" doctrine set out in In re Abrams 9 which held that if the
process could be carried out with pencil and paper it was unpatentable.
Shortly after the publication of the guidelines, In re Prater" was de-
cided. The Patent Office had rejected Prater's machine and process claims
because they were tied to a general purpose computer. However, the Court
of Custom and Patent Appeals (CCPA) rejected the Patent Office argu-
ments. Upon rehearing, it affirmed the machine claim but rejected the pro-
cess claims for lack of specification. " The court reaffirmed the approach
it had originally taken in Ex Parte King," and, shortly thereafter, the Patent
Office withdrew its guidelines."3
In accordance with the CCPA's rejection of the Patent Office's ap-
proach to the patentability of computer software, four computer software
patents issued by the Patent Office were appealed and reversed by the
CCPA." In the patent claims case of In re Barnhart," the court reaffirmed
34S. Doc. No. 5, 90TH CONG., IST SESS. 12-13 (1967).
35 Examination of Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 15609, 15610
(1968), rescinded, 34 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1969).
9694 U.S. 780 (1876).
3 7 The Supreme Court in Cochrane stated: "A process is a mode of treatment of certain
materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing." Id. at 788.
38 See M. Pope & P. Pope, supra note 4, at 537.
39 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
- 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), af'd in part, rev'd in part on rehearing, 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
42 Id. at 415 F.2d 1393, 1406. In order for a patent to be granted, the inventor must provide
a complete description of the apparatus or process. Section 112 of the United States Code
provides, "The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
clearly connected to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
42 146 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 590 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1964). The court in King maintained that
the combination of a general purpose computer with a new, special purpose computer
program culminates in a new, patentable apparatus.
43 34 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1964).
44See Scafetta, supra note 9, at 392, n.45.
45 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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Prater and noted the differences between the computer and the "mental
steps" of the human mind. In In re Musgrave," however, the CCPA de-
parted from the "mental steps" test of In re Abram and, promulgated a
new test. The court held that the mere fact that some steps can be carried
out "mentally" does not preclude acceptance as long as the invention
is considered to be a "technological art" as defined by Section 101.
According to the court, the "technological arts" include those arts that
aid the constitutional purpose of promoting the "useful arts."' 8 The CCPA
went on to reverse two more computer software patent applications in
favor of the inventors by applying the "technological arts" test of In re
Musgrave."
The first case dealing with the question of computer software patents
to reach the Supreme Court was Gottschalk v. Benson." The Benson in-
vention was a computational algorithm which converted binary coded
decimal (BCD) numbers into ordinary decimal numbers."1 The Patent
Office, maintaining its restricted view of the patentability of computer soft-
ware, rejected the patent claims.5" The CCPA, following its approach in In
re Musgrave, reversed the Patent Office and found that the claims passed
the scrutiny of Section 101's "useful arts" test, thus affirming its rejection
of the In re Abram "mental steps" doctrine.58 On review, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the CCPA decision and held that the claims could
not be allowed since they would effectively preempt the use of the algorithm
for any other use.'
While the Benson decision was widely seen as barring patents for
all computer software,55 the Supreme Court expressly stated that its decision
did not preclude future patent protection of computer software. 8 In subse-
-431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
4t Id. at 893. Section 101 of the United States Code provides, "Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
,S Id.
49 See Scafetta, supra note 9, at 392, n.48 citing: In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A,
1972); In re Mcflroy, 442 F.2d 1397 (C.C.PA. 1971).
60409 U.S. 63 (1972).
51 ld. at 64.
52 In re Benson, 441 F.2d 680 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
83 Id.
5" 409 U.S. at 71.
35 See, e.g., Comment, Patentability: Piecing Together the Computer Software Patent Puzzle,
19 ST. Louis U.LJ. 351 (1975); Note, Gottschalk v. Benson - The Supreme Court Takes
a Hard Line on Software, 47 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 635 (1978).
The Court in Benson stated: "It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any pro-
gram servicing a computer. We do not so hold." 409 U.S. at 71.
COMMENT
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quent decisions the CCPA has failed to grasp this aspect of the Benson
decision by holding that patent claims directed toward mathematical
results are unpatentable.57
Since Benson, the CCPA has continued to decide the validity of patent
claims for software on the basis of whether the process is directed toward
a mathematical (unpatentable) or non-mathematical (patentable) result."
Nevertheless, the CCPA's narrow interpretation of Benson clashed with
the Patent and Trademark Office's (PTO) view." As a result, when the
second computer software patentability case, Dann v. Johnston,e' came be-
fore the United States Supreme Court, it was hoped the Court would settle
the confusion surrounding the Benson decision.61
Dann v. Johnston involved a "machine system for automatic record
keeping for bank checks and deposits."' 2 Actually, the system was a general
purpose computer and computer program. 8 The Patent Office had rejected
the application for a patent, but the CCPA reversed" on the grounds that
the machine-type claims did not come within the process restricted holding
of Benson, nor was the claim in the nature of an algorithm which could
not be patented. 5 Rather than expanding Benson to exclude machine as
well as process claims or limiting Benson by merely denying patent pro-
tection to the algorithms, the Court reversed the CCPA decision on the
ground of obviousness under Section 103.10
Following Dann v. Johnston, the CCPA continued to utilize the mathe-
matical/non-mathematical distinction enunciated in Benson to determine
the patentability of computer software." ' For example, in In re Freeman"
57 See, e.g., In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611, 612 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (the patent application
had been previously upheld by the C.C.P.A. but was reversed on rehearing); In re Christen-
sen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973); see also, In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997 (C.C.PA.
1972).
"3 See generally, Nimtz, supra note 16, at 15, nn.65, 66 and accompanying text.
59 Id.
-o425 U.S. 219 (1976).
61 See note 55 supra. The Patent Office interpreted Benson as effectively preempting all
patents for computer programs; however, the C.C.P.A. limited Benson as only applying to
those computer programs which were directed solely to a mathematical result.
- 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976).
63 Id. at 222.
64 In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
65 Id. at 771.
-8425 U.S. at 220, 225-230. Section 103 of the United States Code provides, "A patent
may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set
forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made." 35 U.SC. § 103 (1976).
Of See note 58 supra,
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the CCPA limited Benson as applying only to mathematical algorithms and
thus allowed patents on other non-Benson computer software."s Consequently,
an attempt was made by the Patent Office to get more cases before the
United States Supreme Court."0 In Parker v. Flook,7 ' the invention was a
method for updating alarm limits in processes involving catalytic conversion
of hydrocarbons. The claim involved an algorithm designed to calculate a
revised alarm limit and then adjust this limit to its new value.7" The Patent
Office rejected Flook's claims,"' citing the CCPA's decision in In re Christ-
ensen " which held that additional steps added to an otherwise unpatentable
method could not render the material patentable."5 The CCPA reversed the
Patent Office and restricted Christensen to factual situations where nothing
actually occurs after the algorithm."8
While noting that Flook limited his claims to the use of the algorithm
only for catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the CCPA holding." The Court saw the issue in Flook
as whether the discovery and application of a novel algorithm would
enable an otherwise non-patentable method of control to be patentable.'
It held that it would not but once again reserved the right to uphold soft-
ware patents."9 The Court also maintained that a claim is not unpatentable
merely because it contains an algorithm" but, instead of utilizing the Benson
test of whether the patent would preempt other uses of the algorithm, the
Court stated that a process will be patentable if the process itself, not
merely the algorithm, is new and useful.8 '
Following Flook, the CCPA has restricted its application by continuing
to allow patent applications for computer software.' On the other hand, the
68573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
69 Id. at 1245.
" Dann v. Chatfield, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Dann v. Noll, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). Both of
these cases were rejected as being untimely filed.
T1437 U.S. 584 (1977).
T2 In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 22 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
Ts8id.
74478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
T5 See, Note, The Patentability of Computer Software, 1979 Wis. L. Riv. 867, 880 (1979).
7e See note 72 supra.
T7 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1977).
78 1 d. at 588.
79 Id. The Court in Parker stated, "Neither the dearth of precedent, nor this decision, should
therefore be interpreted as reflecting a judgment that patent protection of certain novel
and useful computer programs will not promote the progress of science and the useful
arts, or that such protection is undesirable as a matter of policy." 437 U.S. at 595.
gold. at 590.
8 Id. at 591.
82 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 13 Q(C.C.P.A. 1978); Mirshleld v. Banner, 462 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1978).
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Patent Office has broadly interpreted Flook in denying similar patent applica-
tions.83 Thus, Flook has not resulted in a clarification of the question of
the patentability of computer software but has only maintained the status
quo. As a result, the parameters of patent protection remain obscure eight
years after the Benson decision.
IV. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
A copyright is a limited monopoly which protects the originality of
a work which has been properly published, registered with the Copyright
Office, and affixed with a copyright notice."' Under the 1976 copyright
law, the protection extends for the life of the author plus fifty years. 5
In the event that the author has been hired to produce the work, which
would be the case with most computer software, the protection of the
copyright extends for a period of 75 years from original publication or
100 years from original creation of the work."
Copyright protection may be obtained for a published computer pro-
gram by attaching a copyright notice to the computer program, delivering
two copies of the program to the Register of Copyrights, and paying the
filing fee.8" While a copyright will protect the holder from infringement by
exact or near exact copies, it offers little protection against the incorpora-
tion of the program concepts in another form. Similar programs using
the same mathematical concepts do not constitute a copyright infringe-
ment.8" This limitation on the scope of copyright protection is based on a
distinction between the physical form of a published work and the use
of the concepts it contains.89
In Baker v. Seldon" the United States Supreme Court refused to extend
copyright protection so far as to prevent utilization of a method published
in a copyrighted work. Sheldon had written a book outlining a new book-
keeping system and had obtained a copyright on the book. It contained
suggested forms to implement the bookkeeping system. Baker began pub-
lishing forms which, while different than Seldon's, accomplished the same
end. The Supreme Court held that Seldon's copyright did not give him the
exclusive right to make and use any bookkeeping forms utilizing the new
85 Sarkar, 588 F.2d at 1331; Johnson, 589 F.2d at 1081.
84 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 401(a) (1976).
85 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976).
" Id.
87 17 U.S.C. H 401(b), 408(b), 708 (1976).
88 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954), rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954)
(copyright only protects the expression of an idea and not the idea itself). See also M. Pope
& P. Pope, supra note 4, at 546.
89 White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
- 101 U.S. 99 (1879),
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bookkeeping system but only those forms which were copyrighted as part
of his book. 1
Almost thirty years after Baker v. Seldon the Supreme Court decided
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Appollo Co.92 This case has become
a prime example of the extent to which protection will be granted to com-
puter software under the copyright law. Appollo Company manufactured
pianola rolls for player pianos which, when played, reproduced music
which had been copyrighted by White-Smith. The Supreme Court refused
to recognize an infringement of White-Smith's copyright. 3 Instead, the
Court held that the pianola roll was not a "copy" of White-Smith's music
as the word was intended under the law."4 Although the Copyright Act of
1909 extended copyright protection to the pianola roll situation, 5 White-
Smith has continued to stand for the principle that, in order to be a copy,
the form must be such as to be perceptible by the human eye.
The Register of Copyrights first began to accept computer software
for registration in 1964.6 The Copyright Office viewed the question of
computer software registration as revolving around two central questions:
(1) Whether a program is the "writing of an author" and, thus,
copyrightable, and
(2) whether a reproduction of the program in a form actually used
to operate or be "read" by a machine is a "copy" that can be
accepted for copyright registration. 7
The Copyright Office indicated that it would continue to resolve doubt-
ful issues in favor of computer software copyright protection. 8 One com-
mentator felt that there was little doubt that any new copyright statute
would expressly provide for computer software and reject the narrow defini-
tion of "copy" set out in White-Smith."9
The Copyright Act of 1976, the first complete revision since the 1909
Act, did not meet these expectations. In fact, Section 117 of the 1976 Act
expressly states:
[Tlhis title [title 17] does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work
91 Id. at 107.
- 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
93 Id. at 18.
94 Id. at 17.
95 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970) (repealed 1976, current version at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
"See Announcement from the Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for Computer Pro-
grams, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 361 (1964).
9T Id.
98 Id.
°9See, e.g., MILLER, COMPUTERS AND COPYRIGHTS IN THE LAW OF COMPUTERS 111 (1971).
COMMENT
11
Rilee: Protection of Property Rights in Computer Software
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981
AKRON LAW REVIEW
any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in
conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing,
retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction with any
similar device, machine or process, than those afforded to work under
the law, whether title 17 or the common law or statutes of a State,
in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed
by a court in an action brought under this title.'
Thus, the effect of the Copyright Act of 1976 has been to maintain
the status quo regarding the copyright protection of computer software. 1
Yet, while clearly not wishing to become involved in the problems of
extending the copyright protection of computer software at this time,
Congress has left the language in the 1976 Act broad enough to accept
the various forms of computer software in the future. For example, Section
101 of the Act defines "copies" as:
Material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.1'
The Act of 1976 also extends copyright protection to unpublished
material if a copyright notice is affixed."0 This protection is exclusively
within the Act."0 Breach of licensing agreements, however, is expressly
preempted from coverage0 ' with the result that disclosures by an employee
of in-house computer software to competition would not be considered a
copyright infringement.'
Recognizing the difficulties associated with providing adequate copy-
right protection for computer software, Congress created the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)
in 1974 to make specific recommendations for legislation.'" Initial guide-
lines promulgated by the Commission state that adequate protection of
computer software under the copyright law should: 1) prevent unauthorized
copying of computer programs, 2) facilitate the lawful use of computer
programs, 3) aid the development and dissemination of computer programs,
and 4) avoid granting more economic power than is necessary to provide
100 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976).
101 See Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S.&A. Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (N.D.
Tex. 1979).
102 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
103 Id. §§ 102, 103, and 104.
104 Id. § 301.
1051 d. § 301(b).
'06 See Comment, supra note 15, at 507, n.29.
107 Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873.
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an incentive to develop computer programs."' 8 The Commission's final report,
released in 1978, recommended that Congress: 1) amend Section 1011
to expressly provide for computer programs to be copyrighted, 2) repeal
Section 117110 which maintains the status quo, and 3) redraft Section
11711 to allow lawful users of computer programs to utilize or adapt these
programs for their own purposes.1 ' The Commission was not unified in its
recommendations; a strong dissent questioned whether computer software
was a proper subject for copyright protection.' In addition, the dissent
recommended that separate legislation be enacted to provide protection of
computer software property rights which would, in essence, recognize its
unique nature.'
Enactment of specific legislation or modification of the Copyright
Act of 1976 has not yet occurred and problem areas remain in utilizing the
copyright to protect property rights in computer software. For example,
a copyright will only protect against substantial and unauthorized copy-
ing." 5 In addition, unauthorized use of the concepts expressed in the com-
puter software is not protected. This means a unique algorithm which is
part of a copyrighted computer program may be utilized in a different form
by another without constituting infringement of the copyrighted program
itself. Furthermore, courts have not been willing to view an object deck as
a copy of a copyrighted computer software source deck. 1 " As long as a
useful version (e.g., object deck) of a computer program can be created
which is not a "copy" within the meaning of the copyright law, the copyright
will provide little protection of the developer's property rights." '
V. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Trade secrecy is the most widely used form of protection of property
rights in computer software" and is derived from the common law and
108 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT (July 31, 1978).
109 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (this section of title 17 merely defines the terms used within
the title).
110 117 U.S.C. § 117 (1976); see note 99 supra and accompanying text.
"I1 See notes 95-100 supra and accompanying text.
112 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 2 (July 31, 1978).
I's Id. at 69.
1 1 4 SoFrwARE SUBCOMMI-rEE OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, REPORT (March 5, 1977).
115 See generally, M. Pope & P. Pope, supra note 4, at 546.
118 Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S.&A. Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
'IT For example, in the Data Cash case, the court held that even if the plaintiff's object
program had been copied by the defendant, it was not within the legal definition of "copy"
and therefore was not actionable. 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1064 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
11s See, e.g., Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 909
(1970).
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state law governing unfair competition.11 A trade secret is defined as a
"formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it."10
There are numerous advantages in acquiring trade secret protection.
For example, it is not necessary to register computer software as a trade
secret in order to obtain legal protection for its development. Also, a com-
puter trade secret does not have to meet the rigid standards of subject
matter, novelty, and non-obviousness which are necessary to obtain a pat-
ent. 2 ' Even if a computer program would otherwise be patentable, the
developer may choose to elect trade secret protection rather than protection
under patent law since the right to patent protection will be lost if the
application is not made within one year after the software has been used
commercially. 2'
Unlike patent or copyright protection which have definite terms, trade
secret protection may be maintained indefinitely. The protection provided
under state trade secret laws may be lost, however, if the computer software
is published or otherwise becomes known. 2 The developer seeking pro-
tection under the laws of trade secrecy must be able to show that adequate
precautions were taken to maintain the confidentiality of the computer
software." ' Courts have placed this burden of proof of adequate precaution
upon the party seeking damages or an injunction under the trade secret
laws. 25 Trade secrecy also does not offer protection against independent
development of the computer software.'
Legal action is normally brought under trade secret laws based on
one of two theories: 1) misappropriation, or 2) breach of contract, either
by unlawful disclosure by an employee or by violation of a licensing agree-
ment."' As discussed above, the burden of proof is on the moving party
to show adequate steps have been taken to protect his trade secret.""
Limited access areas and employee non-disclosure contracts may be used
11 9 See RmTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
0 Id. at Comment b.
1n 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1976).
122 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
123 See, e.g., Bender, supra note 118, at 928.
124Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines, 367 F. Supp. 258, 330 (N.D. Okla.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802
(1975).
125 Id. at 348.
12e See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
"27 Wydick, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein and Kewanee, 55 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 736, 739 (1973), continued, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 4 (1974).
128 See notes 124-125 supra.
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to reduce the risk of loss of the trade secret by misappropriation or wrong-
ful disclosure. Since computer software is often licensed for use by an-
other party, the licensor should be careful to deal with responsible licensees.
If he does not, the right to protection under state trade secret laws may
be lost since courts are apt to view this as a failure to take adequate pro-
tective measures.""
Other than the difficulties of administering and maintaining computer
software secrecy, federal preemption has been a major roadblock to the
effective use of state trade secret laws for the protection of computer soft-
ware. The preemption of state law by federal law may occur when: 1)
federal and state law are in direct conflict, 2) Congress intended to exclude
state regulation, or 3) the burden of similar dual state and federal regu-
lation is considered too great."' Five major cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court have been instrumental in defining what will or
will not be allowed protection under state trade secret law.
The first two of these cases, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co?' and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 2 involved lighting fixtures which
had been patented. An action was brought under both federal patent and
state unfair competition laws. The patents were struck down by the lower
courts but the unfair competition action for damages and injunction was
affirmed.131 The Supreme Court reversed both decisions. ' The Court in
Sears held that to grant plaintiff's invention patent-like protection under
state law when no federal patent was warranted would be to give greater
protection than the federal patent law provided." The Court refused to
allow such an anomoly. While the Sears and Compco cases were not brought
before the Court under state trade secret laws, commentators saw the cases
as severely limiting availability of state trade secret protection for un-
patentable inventions." '
129 Id.
180A discussion of the federal preemption doctrine may be found in THE FEDERALIST No.
32, p. 241 (B. Wright ed. 1961), cited in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1972).
For a detailed discussion of the application and history of the federal preemption doctrine,
see 412 U.S. at 552-560.
131376 U.S. 225 (1964).
132 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
1a Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
184 376 U.S. at 232, 233; 376 U.S. at 238, 239.
25 See 376 U.S. at 232.
136 Id. note 13 and accompanying text. For example, one commentator noted:
[In the Sears-Compco opinions, Justice Black does not confine himself to this narrow
definition of public domain. Instead, he implies that all inventions are initially in the
public domain regardless of whether a patent was sought covering them. Carried to
the limit of its logic, this would seem to say that all state trade secret protection for
inventions is preempted.
Adelman & Jaress, Inventions and the Law of Trade Secrets after Lear v. Adkins, 16
WAYNE L. Rnv. 77, 82 (1969).
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The third major case to come before the Supreme Court was Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins."' Adkins had contracted with Lear to develop an improved
gyroscope for aircraft use. Adkins confidentially disclosed his method to
Lear in return for royalty payments and agreed to license the invention
under any forthcoming patent. Lear stopped paying Adkins royalties on
the ground that nothing new had been invented. A patent was subsequently
issued to Adkins and he sued Lear for both pre-patent and post-patent roy-
alties under state trade secret and federal patent laws, respectively.
Lear contended that no royalties were due for the post-patent period
because the patent was invalid. 3 Adkins argued that the doctrine of
licensor-licensee estoppel prevented a patent licensee from challenging the
validity of the licensor's patent.' The Supreme Court overruled the licen-
sor-licensee estoppel doctrine and held that Adkins would not be able
to bring an action for the patent royalties until the issue of the validity
of the patent was decided.' °4 The Court thus held that public disclosure
of the invention by way of the patent precluded Adkins from recovering
royalties under state trade secret laws."' The Supreme Court then refused
to decide whether, and to what extent, the states may act to protect un-
patented trade secrets and remanded the case to the lower court to determine
what pre-patent award royalties, if any, were due.'
The dissenters in Lear, Justices Black, Douglas, and Chief Justice
Warren, argued that Sears and Compco had already decided that state
trade secret laws were preempted by federal patent law. "3 In addition, they
viewed federal patent law as preempting state trade secret laws both prior
and subsequent to disclosure.1 4 Lower courts have had some difficulty
with this decision and the dissent's view of Sears and Compco.45 As a result,
one court distinguished Sears and Compco as applying only to inventions
which were applicable directly to the public and not to private licensing
agreements.",6
The fourth major case to come before the Supreme Court breathed
new life back into the protection of property rights by state trade secret
13T 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
138 d. at 659.
139Id. at 662. The Supreme Court had previously affirmed the doctrine of licensor-licensee
estoppel in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
140 Id. at 676.
141 Id. at 668.
142 Id. at 675-676.
1 4d. at 676-677.
I" Id.
145 See, e.g., Dekar Industries, Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971).
1I" Painton & Co., Ltd. v. Bourns Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 223 (2nd Cir. 1971).
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laws. Goldstein v. California" ' was a criminal action brought under a
California statute"4 8 prohibiting phonorecord piracy. The defendant argued
that the statute was preempted by federal copyright law which did not allow
the copyrighting of phonorecords at the time the piracy took place. The
Supreme Court upheld the California statute, noting that the Constitution
did not expressly vest all power to grant copyright protection in the federal
government' 9 and that the California statute did not directly conflict with
federal copyright law.' The Supreme Court also distinguished and limited
its early holdings in Sears and Compco to situations in which state law
conflicted with the objectives of federal patent law.'
The issue of federal preemption of state trade secret laws was finally
put to rest in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.5 The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit"5 3 seemed to follow the dissent in Lear and held that
state trade secret laws were preempted by federal patent law if the in-
vention would have been patentable, but a patent had not been applied for
or the inventor had lost the right to apply for a patent through commercial
use of the invention for more than one year."' Many commentators dis-
agreed and regarded the decision as the beginning of the end of state
trade secret laws.'55 The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that
no present or real possibility of future conflict existed between federal
patent and state trade secret laws. 5 ' The Court stated, "Certainly the patent
policy of encouraging invention is not disturbed by the existence of another
form of incentive to invention. In this respect the two systems [patent and
trade secret law] are not and never would be in conflict."''5
The apparent inconsistency between Lear and Kewanee is best ex-
plained in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.'58 Aronson involved a con-
tract for the use of an invention not yet patented. Royalties of 5 % of the
selling price were to be paid if a patent was issued and 2 % if a patent
was not granted. Quick Point argued that the contract for the royalties was
preempted by federal patent law since Aronson failed to receive a patent.
The Supreme Court rejected this position and held that federal patent law
247 412 U.S. 546 (1972).
14
8 CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(h) (West 1970).
149 412 U.S. at 558.
250 Id. at 559.
15' Id. at 569-570.
152416 U.S. 470 (1974).
153 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
254 Id. at 1086.
155 See, e.g., Wydick, supra note 127, at 757.
156 416 U.S. at 493.
157 Id. at 484.
158440 U.S. 257 (1978).
COMMENT
17
Rilee: Protection of Property Rights in Computer Software
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981
AKRON LAW REVIEW
does not preempt state contract law so as to preclude enforcement of the
contract.15 The Court viewed the payment of the 2 % royalty as the
price Quick Point was willing to pay to enable it to advance in the market-
place."' The Court then distinguished Lear as not applying when a patent
had never been issued.'6
VI. CONCLUSION
Today, federal copyright law only protects the copyright holder from in-
fringement by exact or near exact copies. The copyright does not provide
protection against the incorporation of computer program concepts in an-
other form. Recent cases tend to question the applicability of patents regard-
ing the protection of computer software and the issues not answered by the
Supreme Court in Benson still prevent drawing clear guidelines for the pat-
entability of computer software. In addition, Lear may preempt concurrent
state protection in the event a computer software patent previously issued is
later held invalid.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that state trade secret laws limit free dis-
closure, do not offer protection against independent discovery, and may require
licensing agreements and restrictive covenants to prevent the loss of the
trade secret to competitors, the United States Supreme Court in Kewanee
affirmed the right of the states to provide independent protection of in-
tellectual property rights. This decision has opened the way for effective
protection of computer software under state trade secret laws. Compared
to the inadequacies of copyright safeguards and the uncertainties of patent
restraints, state trade secret law offers the best, albeit limited, protection.
EDWARD W. RILEE
159 id.
lo Id. at 264.
161 The Court in Aronson said, "In Lear ... we held that a person licensed to use a
patent may challenge the validity of the patent, and that a licensee who establishes that
the patent is invalid need not pay the royalties accrued under the licensing agreement subse-
quent to the issuance of the patent. Both holdings relied on desirability of encouraging licen-
sees to challenge the validity of patents, to further the strong federal policy that only
inventions which meet the rigorous requirements of patentability shall be withdrawn from
the public domain. . . . Accordingly, neither the holding nor the rationale of Lear controls
when no patent has issued, and no ideas have been withdrawn from public use." Id.
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